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Abstract— The emerging technology of vehicular communica-
tions (VC) raises a number of technical problems that need
to be addressed. Among those, security and privacy concerns
are paramount for the wide adoption of VC. In this position
paper, we are concerned with privacy and identity management
in the context of these systems. We identify VC-specific issues and
challenges, considering the salient features of these systems. In
particular, we view them in the context of other broader privacy
protection efforts, as well as in the light of on-going work for
VC standardization, and other mobile wireless communication
technologies.1
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of initiatives that seek to create safer and more ef-
ficient driving conditions have recently drawn strong support.
The key enabling technology towards this goal are Vehicular
communications (VC). Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET)
are envisioned to support a variety of applications for safety,
traffic efficiency and driver assistance, and infotainment. For
example, warnings on environmental hazards (e.g., ice on
the pavement) or abrupt vehicle kinetic changes (e.g., emer-
gency braking), traffic and road conditions (e.g., congestion
or construction sites), and tourist information downloads will
be provided by such systems. The European Commission
is sponsoring a large number of eSafety projects such as
Prevent (preventive safety) [1], Safespot (cooperation for road
safety) [2], CVIS (cooperation for traffic efficiency) [3], and
Coopers (seamless services along the travel chain) [4].
A number of concerted research efforts in the industry and
the academia are currently investigating a pleiad of technical
issues. The realization of VC systems, however, is strongly
dependent on their security and privacy protection features.
Without security integrated into vehicular communication
protocols, these systems can make anti-social and criminal
behavior easier, in ways that will actually jeopardize the
benefits from their deployment.
Beyond VC, the protection of privacy, which is the focus on
this paper, that is, the management of personal data dissemina-
tion, has been increasingly important with the proliferation of
Internet and mobile communication applications. The outcome
of this growing awareness has been a number of recent and
on-going research projects focusing on privacy protection:
1This work is sponsored in part by the European Commission (IST-027795,
framerwork 6 priority 2.4.12, eSafety)
PAMPAS [5], Modinis-IDM [6], PORTIA [7], FIDIS [8], and
of course PRIME [9]. At the same time, coordination and liaise
efforts have been underway in the context of SecurIST [10]
and eSafety [11].
The emerging vehicular communication systems are not
merely a subset or an extension of the cyber-space, but rather
raise a number of specific issues and unique challenges with
their salient features. As such, we believe that addressing
privacy and identity management in VC warrants not only
novel approaches but it can also have a strong impact in the
overall architecture, beyond security, of those systems.
In the rest of this position paper, we first outline the charac-
teristics of vehicular networks and the on-going development
and standardization efforts. We then discuss what can consti-
tute identities in the VC context. We consider the challenges
that lie ahead, in the form of requirements and objectives,
and identify points of similarity or difference with current
privacy-enhancing identity management approaches. Finally,
we briefly survey the scope and suitability of standardized
mobile wireless communication technologies with respect to
the problem at hand.
II. VEHICULAR NETWORKS
The entities that are part of a vehicular communications
system are private and public vehicles, road-side infrastructure,
and authorities, with the latter considered primarily as network
entities. An authority will be responsible for the identity and
credential management for all vehicles registered in its region
(e.g., national territory, state, canton, metropolitan area), simi-
larly to what is currently the case. Public vehicles (e.g. police
cars) may have specific roles and be considered as mobile
infrastructure.
VANET will enable both vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-
roadside communications. Vehicular networking protocols will
require nodes, that is, vehicles or road-side infrastructure units,
to communicate directly when in range, or in general across
multiple wireless links (hops). Nodes will act both as end
points and routers, since vehicle-to-vehicle communication can
often be the only way to realize safety and driving assistance
applications, while the deployment of an omnipresent infras-
tructure can be impractical and too costly. In fact, vehicular
networks are emerging as the first commercial instantiation of
the mobile ad hoc networking (MANET) technology.
Fig. 1. Secure Vehicular Communications System - An Architectural View
VANET may ultimately rely on several communication
channels, including for example cellular telephony or broad-
band wireless (e.g., WiMax [23]) transceivers. Nevertheless,
the emerging defacto standard is the DSRC (Dedicated Short
Range Communications) [12]. DSRC is based on IEEE 802.11
technology and proceeds towards standardization under the
name of IEEE 802.11p. Roadside infrastructure may con-
sist of short-range (up to 1 km) DSRC base stations placed
on intersections, highways, and other critical spots of the
transportation infrastructure. Or it may leverage on licensed-
frequency technologies (e.g., cellular), with the Continuous
Air interface for Long and Medium distance (CALM) platform
combining WLAN and GPSR technologies [3] for example.
There is a number of completed and ongoing projects on
VC all over the world, such as the Berkeley PATH [13]and the
Fleetnet [14] projects in the USA and Germany respectively,
beyond those within eSafety [11]. However, VC security is not
considered in those projects either. This is why new projects
strive now to investigate security issues.
The US Vehicle Safety Communication Consortium
(VSCC) promotes and produces the DSRC standards for VC,
part of which is the IEEE P1609.2/D2 draft standard [?].
It proposes using asymmetric cryptography to sign safety
messages, while keys and IP and MAC addresses change over
time, as measures to achieve some degree of unlinkability.
Node certificates are envisioned to have short lifetimes and
are periodically requested by vehicles through roadside base
stations.
VC security is considered to a certain extent the European
Global System for Telematics (GST) [17] and the German
Network on Wheels (NoW) [16] projects. This is also true
for the Car2Car Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) and
in particular its security workgroup [18]. Security and privacy
are among the primary objectives of the recently started
SEcure VEhicular COMmunications (SEVECOM) European
project [19].
III. IDENTITIES IN VC SYSTEMS
The identity of the entities that make part of a vehicular
communication (VC) system, as discussed in the previous
section, is data that uniquely characterize them. In general, an
identity can be context-specific. Independently of VC, vehicles
and transportation systems have been in place for many years,
and so have administrative processes, including management
of the identities of the involved entities. In this section, we first
briefly describe what has been the status quo before the advent
of VC systems. Then, we pose the question and consider what
can and will constitute an identity in the context of VC.
Vehicles have a predominant role in VC, while a tight
coupling between vehicles and users, especially drivers, will
usually exist. In general, the driver-vehicle relation is many-
to-many, as a driver can operate many vehicles, and similarly,
many users may be entitled to operate a particular vehicle.
Even though the two types of entities are clearly distinct, as
it will become clear later, they may be bound to each other.
Currently, the identities of vehicles and (their) users are
managed by a variety of organizations. The identity of the
users is in general established by states (e.g., identity cards,
passports), and in the context of transportation by specific
organizations, such as the Department of Motor Vehicles
(DMV), which grant drivers licenses and attest to the ability
of users to operate a vehicle.
The DMV is responsible for the identification of vehicles
as well. On the one hand, the registration process, which is
repeated periodically, has basically a two-fold output. First, a
license plate that uniquely identifies the vehicle, determining
the issuing authority, perhaps a division within the area cov-
ered by or corresponding to the authority, and an identifying
string. Second, a binding between the plate, the vehicle, and
the owner of the vehicle.
Nonetheless, identification is not done by the authority (e.g.,
DMV) alone, but can involve manufacturers. The vehicle itself
is, on the other hand, identified by a presumed unique and
assigned by the manufacturer vehicle identification number
(VIN), as well as technical details such as manufacturer, date
of production, model and color.
All these ’brick-and-mortar’ attributes are expected to be
part of digital identities, which are to be defined in VC
systems. Nonetheless, an electronic-world identity of a vehicle
can be significantly broader, or multiple identities may exist
and used alternately as needed. The reason is that a large
variety of applications will emerge, mixing not only attributes
as those mentioned above, but also including new ones that
convey access control privileges to on-line data and services.
The variety of applications will be commensurate with the
multiplicity of identities that will be used by vehicles and
users.
At the same time, the VC systems will necessitate, beyond
the application context, a within-the-network identification of
nodes. This will transcend the entire networking protocol
stack: network addresses at the data link and network layers
(e.g,. NIC and IP address respectively), end node identifiers
(e.g., TCP port), and user-friendly names. All these identifiers,
seemingly independent according to the layering concept,
as well as other context specific data, such as geographical
coordinates, can be critical in terms of privacy.
IV. CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES
Digital identities and their attributes should be designed and
managed within VC systems. These tasks will be undertaken
by multiple organizations or authorities, which will be respon-
sible for generating and granting credentials for the VC system
entities.
Personal or sensitive data warrant special protection or
limited disclosure. Yet, as vehicular networks are systems in
the making, decisions by involved parties are necessary to
specify both precise requirements and processes for privacy
protection. Especially because privacy is a rather broad notion.
One approach, generally applied beyond the VC context,
is the use of pseudonyms. These identifiers do not carry
information about the identity of the system entities, in a way
that any two or more pseudonyms cannot be correlated with
the same identity and thus entity. An equally general approach
is to equip the system with fine-grained control of the entities
on the sought level of privacy. Furthermore, to ensure the
minimum amount of identity information is disclosed for a
specific context and transaction.
At the same time, access control and accountability are
indispensable security attributes for VC systems [20]. This
means that the above-discussed objective of anonymity, that is,
concealing one’s identity and avoiding linkability (with respect
to a set of observers) of one’s actions to its own identity, is
not straightforward to achieve. In fact, the two aspects are
seemingly contradicting.
Consequently, it appears that full and unconditional
anonymity will not be acceptable. This is implied by the
current status quo, with strong identification processes for
vehicles and users in place. The notion of anonymous cre-
dentials with revocable anonymity has already been considered
beyond VC; see for example [21] and references within. More
specific requirements, such as anonymity revocation (’de-
anonymization’) globally or locally, are also relevant to VC,
as it is almost certain that multiple administrative authorities
will co-exist.
The system should enable different entities to obtain mul-
tiple credentials, perhaps from different organizations, to sup-
port the wide range of envisioned VANET functionality. Yet,
the system should prevent users from sharing their credentials,
either by passing them among themselves or ’presenting’ them
so that a third party is misled that the credentials belong to
the same entity.
So far, we discussed in this section ’similarities,’ in terms
of requirements and characteristics, with existing or under-
development, beyond the VC context, techniques for privacy
protection. However, what can be more interesting are the
’differences’ due to considerations that are specific, if not
unique, to VC systems. At first, clearly, VC systems will not
be merely another wireless technology to access the Internet
(even though this will be supported as well), but a much more
complex system that enables applications specific to the VC
mission.
VC systems are not necessarily user-centric. Rather, non-
human entities, vehicles, and most important, vehicles owned
or operated by private parties, will be multiply identifiable and
play a central role. One could view the vehicle as the user,
yet what remains as a difference is the the level of automation
that the VC systems will require.
The significance of the vehicle role is mostly due to es-
tablished administrative processes we discussed in Sec. III.
Furthermore, not only the vehicle itself but the operational
condition of any of its individual subsystems (sensory or me-
chanical) may be of interest and necessary to be identifiable.
This clues clearly on the importance of robustness, yet,
in our context, clues also on the importance of liability and
accountability, and, more subtly, on the role of the VANET
communication pattern: frequent, if not continuous, vehicle to
vehicle communication.
Communication in VANET will often, if not mostly, be
not of transactional nature. Nodes will transmit data that
are not addressed to a particular node, or in other words,
communication will not be unicast, with two-party protocols.
Instead, messages will be mostly ’floating’ across the network,
i.e., broad- multi- or any- casted, with destinations defined in
terms of context- or node- specific attributes (e.g., location, or
node characteristics).2
Such VC-specific communication, nonetheless, is at a rel-
atively high rate; some representative widely accepted value:
at least one message generated per node every 200 or 300
milliseconds. Depending on the density of the network, and the
area across which each such message propagates, a multiple
number of messages will need to be validated at each node.
What is important is the network overhead due to the cryp-
tographic mechanisms, especially if anonymity is supported.
Moreover, the processing overhead can be a significant issue.
To illustrate this, we consider for the sake of an example,
the Idemix system [22]: the showing of a credential with all
optimizations mentioned by the authors (not implemented at
the time of [22]), for the system running at a Pentium III, needs
a running time of 2.5 seconds. This is roughly a period of
time during which at least 12 messages should be transmitted.
Of course, further application-specific optimizations may be
possible, or somewhat more powerful on-board platforms may
be used. Yet, this back of the envelope calculation points out
the importance of processing overhead.
Finally, regarding communication, VC mandates that a
significant fraction of the total traffic, namely safety messages,
is frequent and periodic. However, it is not at the discretion of
the user/owner of the device to stop or enable it. Furthermore,
in contrast with approaches for ubiquitous computing, the
user will not elect but will by default engage in context-rich
(including, for example, the sender’s/receivers’ coordinates)
communication.
What is most important is that vehicle-to-vehicle commu-
nications will call for anonymity as well as security (e.g., au-
thentication). Moreover, anonymity appears as a pre-requisite
for the channel communication; in other words, achieving
2More ’traditional’ types of communication are surely possible and ex-
pected; the actual fraction of the overall traffic can only be determined once
a set of applications are at the (pre-)deployment phase.
anonymity during a transaction is not meaningful if network
communication allows a vehicle to be tracked otherwise.
V. RELATED MOBILE AND WIRELESS NETWORKING
TECHNOLOGIES
Considering identity management and privacy protection, it
can be useful to look at standardized wireless communication
technologies. At first, we take cellular networks and GSM
as an example. There are two forms of IDs in GSM; the
first one being the International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI), which identifies the subscriber and is stored in the SIM
card. The cellphone providers keep a database, the so called
Home Location Register (HLR) where these IMSI is connected
to the subscriber data. Second, there is the International
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), which uniquely identifies
the GSM equipment. Similarly to the HLR a provider keeps a
Equipment Identity Register (EIR) where the IMEIs of banned
or monitored mobile phones are stored.
All the identity management within a network is completely
managed by the provider, including authentication and revoca-
tion. In case of roaming between providers, they grant access
to their HLR so authentication can take place. In cellular
networks, the mobile nodes only attach and authenticate with
the base stations of own or foreign providers (in case of
roaming). Therefore authentication and especially generation
and resolution of pseudonyms are straight-forward, the base
station plus core network is considered to be trusted. This is
not the case in VANETs, where cars communicate with each
other or with infrastructure provided by multiple organizations
who may not all be considered trusted.
In order to protect privacy, there is a form of pseudonyms,
the so called Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI).
It is assigned to a mobile device as soon as it connects to a
Location Area and used thereafter instead of the IMSI. This
should prevent tracking of devices. Of course if an attacker
manages to eavesdrop on the initial handshake, it will be able
to track the device by its TMSI later on. Mechanisms like
the IMSI Catcher also show the vulnerabilities and concept
failures of the system.
To probe further, we consider the Wireless LANs according
to IEEE 802.11. There are no identities in the core WLAN
standard itself, perhaps with the exception of the unique MAC
addresses used. Instead there is the option of using a shared
key for accessing the network.
The IEEE 802.1x/802.11i additional mechanisms, when
used, provide a standard authentication mechanism with the
access point, using the credentials for authentication. The
credentials are typically managed in one or more radius
servers that check the authentication credentials. However,
these servers are not expected to be available online in VANET
scenarios.
There is no real mechanism for privacy protection in
WLANs, as MAC addresses are always sent in the clear. How-
ever, at least IEEE 802.1x/EAP-TLS secures the authentication
dialogue, so the credentials cannot be eavesdropped.
Finally, a number of approaches have been proposed for
generic MANET, which are neither standardized nor target
necessarily specific applications. For example, the instantiation
of certification authorities in a distributed manner, with net-
work nodes acting as CA servers, has been proposed. However,
literature on MANET has largely neglected the question of
identity management. The development of VANET, with a
more precise application context, not only allows to pose spe-
cific questions on identity management but also move towards
providing answers. Furthermore, requirements on anonymity
and privacy protection, which were largely not investigated in
the context of MANET, can be set more precisely.
VI. CONCLUSION
The pursuit of security and privacy-enhancing identity
management are two seemingly conflicting objectives. For
example, system entities can be accountable if they can be
linked to their actions (objects resulting from their actions),
but entities maintain their anonymity if they cannot be linked
to their actions. The solution lies in-between: pseudonymity
and conditional anonymity, with designated entities capable
of extracting information about a pseudonym, is one approach
the can cover the space between the two extremes.
However, before one applies such an approach, or any other
one, to the vehicular communications (VC) environment, a
precise requirement specification as well as a large number of
architectural and design choices must be made. Most impor-
tant, the salient features of VC, along with other extraneous
constraints and requirements, must be accounted for.
In this paper, we presented a first discussion on privacy
and identity management for VC and identified challenges and
open issues. At the same time, we discussed currently stan-
dardized and other proposed related approaches, and presented
on-going efforts in the industry and the academia. This is the
space from which future solutions to safeguard privacy will
emerge.
In place of conclusion, we note that privacy is not a matter
to disregard: even a few events of compromising users’ privacy
can fuel an increase in user distrust, slow down deployment (to
the extent this is not mandated by law), and perhaps impede
adoption of vehicular communication systems.
Nevertheless, we believe that this is an excellent opportunity
for VANETs to address security and privacy issues: their devel-
opment is already taking place under different conditions that
the development of older mobile communication technologies.
Moreover, we are confident that SeVeCom, in conjunction
with other on-going projects, can ensure that both objectives,
security and privacy, will be achieved.
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